Estate of Smith - Deductibility of Administration Expenses Under the Internal Revenue Code and Under the Teasury Regulations: Resolving the Conflict by unknown
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 8
Estate of Smith - Deductibility of Administration
Expenses Under the Internal Revenue Code and
Under the Teasury Regulations: Resolving the
Conflict
Copyright c 1975 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Estate of Smith - Deductibility of Administration Expenses Under the Internal Revenue Code and Under
the Teasury Regulations: Resolving the Conflict, 17 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 363 (1975),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss2/8
COMMENTS
ESTATE OF SMITH-DEDUCTIBILITY OF
ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES UNDER THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE AND UNDER THE TREASURY
REGULATIONS: RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
The federal estate tax, in effect since 1916, is imposed on-the transfer
of property at death. Although all property deemed to have been trans-
ferred at death must be included in computing the gross estate," the
Internal Revenue Code specifies several items that are deducted there-
from2 in order to determine the taxable estate. One of these deductions
is for administrative expenses; pursuant to section 2053 (a) of the Code'
these expenses are deductible if allowable4 under state law. Treasury
1. INT. REv, CODE oF 1954, § 2031.
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2052-56.
3. Section 2053 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides:
(a) General Rule-For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the
value of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the
value of the gross estate such amounts-
(1) for funeral expenses,
(2) for administration expenses,
(3) for claims against the estate, and
(4) for unpaid mortgages on, or any indebtedness in respect of,
property where the value of the decedent's interest therein, undi-
minished by such mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value
of the gross estate,
as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without
the United States, under which the estate is being administered.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 2053 (a) (emphasis supplied).
The deductions under section 2053 are designed to take into account the realities
of the decedents financial situation when he died and, therefore, assure an application
of the tax rates to a realistic taxable estate. The other deduction provisions contained
in sections 2052, 2054, 2055 and 2056 are more a matter of Congressional largesse.
R. STEPHENS & G. MAxFIELD, THE FEDERAL ESTATE- AND GIFT TAxES 164 (1959).
Similar provisions were contained in section 812(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939, and in prior Revenue Acts.
4. Section 2053 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 uses the word "allowable"
instead of the word "allowed," which appeared in section 812(b) of the Internal
Rev nue Code of 1939 and prior corresponding sections. The committee reports do
not mention specifically this change in statutory language. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the change as follows: "This change seems to
imply that the policy of the Code is not to rely on formal probated actions in
determining permissible deductions. The Eighth Circuit has suggested the reason for
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Regulations sections 20.2053-3 (a) and (d) 5 impose an additional re-
quirement, however, on expenses connected with the sale of property of
the estate; a deduction is permitted only if the sale is necessary to pay
debts or taxes, to preserve the estate, or to effect distribution.
In Estate of Smith v. Commissioner6 the executors challenged the va-
lidity of these regulations. The expenses in question had been allowed
by the state probate court, but the Tax Court 7 found this fact insufficient
to establish their deductibility under section 2053 (a). The court held
that the statute establishes only a threshold condition and that "the
requirements of [the] regulations must also be satisfied." 8 On appeal by
this policy: Section 2053 (a) is meant to apply anywhere in the world, 'even in
countries where administration of estates is had otherwise than through courts, if any
such countries exist'." Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1967), quoting
Commissioner v. Bronson, 32 F.2d 112, 114 (8th Cir. 1929) (emphasis supplied by
Pitner Court). For another explanation, see 4 J. MERTENS, THE LAW Op FEDERAL AND
ESTrAE TAXATIO § 2602, at 7 n.7 (1959).
5. Treasury Regulation section 20.2053-3 (a) provides:
(a) In general. The amounts deductible from a decedents gross estate
as "administration expenses" of the first category (see paragraphs (a)
and (c) of § 20.2053-1) are limited to such expenses as are actually and
necessarily incurred in the administration of the decedents estate; that is,
in the collection of assets, payment of debts, and distribution of property
to the persons entitled to it. The expenses contemplated in the law are
such only as attend the settlement of an estate and the transfer of the
property of the estate to individual beneficiaries or to a trustee, whether
the trustee is the executor or some other person. Expenditures not essential
to the proper settlement of the estate, but incurred for the individual bene-
fit of the heirs, legatees, or devisees, may not be taken as deductions.
Administration expenses include (1) executor's commissions; (2) attorney's
fees; and (3) miscellaneous expenses. Each of these classes is considered
separately in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) (1958).
Treasury Regulation section 20.2053-3 (d) (2) provides:
"(d) Miscellaneous administration expenses....
(2) Expenses for selling property of the estate are deductible if the sale
is necessary in order to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of administra-
tion, or taxes, to preserve the estate, or to effect distribution. The phrase
'expenses for selling property' includes brokerage fees and other expenses
attending the sale, such as the fees of an auctioneer if it is reasonably
necessary to employ one."
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3 (d) (2), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 367, 368.
6. 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'g 57 T.C. 650 (1972), cert. denied, Lowe v. Com-
missioner, 44 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975).
7. Estate of David Smith, 57 T.C. 650 (1972). The validity of the regulations was
not challenged in the Tax Court; for a discussion of the procedural development of
this issue, see note 69 infra.
8. Id. at 661.
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the executors, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed9
without specific approval of this language; the validity of the regula-
tions was not considered. Instead, the court held that the Tax Court
merely had exercised the prerogative of a federal court, when applying
a federal taxing statute, to make its own de novo determination of the
relevant state law.10
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit failed to consider a prior
decision declaring the regulations invalid. In Estate of Park v. Com-
missioner1 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had rejected the
reasoning of the Tax Court in the Smith case. Park held that the literal
language of section 2053 (a) provides that the deductibility of administra-
tive expenses be governed exclusively by their allowability under state
law.12 As the expenditures at issue had been allowed by the state probate
court, they were necessarily deductible under section 2053 (a)."
CASE LAW PRIOR TO SMITH
Because courts, prior to Smith and Park, did not consider carefully
whether section 2053 (a) of the Code conflicts with the regulations issued
thereunder, inconsistent case law has developed. In the Tax Court, for
instance, some decisions' 4 have permitted deductions solely upon a find-
9. 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975).
10. Id. at 483. The case is discussed in detail, infra notes 65 et seq. & accompanying
text.
11. 475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'g 57 T.C. 705 (1972). See generally 52 N.C. L.
Rnv. 190 (1973).
The Smith dissent, however, agreed with the Park holding "that the plain meaning
of the statute controls and that the Congress intended deductibility to be determined
by state law." 510 F.2d at 483 (Mulligan, J., dissenting).
12. 475 F.2d at 676.
13. Id.
14. Estate of Marie A. DeFoucaucourt, 62 T.C. 485 (1974) (taxpayers permitted to
deduct two sets of commissions for duties as trustees and executors because "under
[state law] 'double' commissions [were] allowable," id. at 489); Estate of Louis
Sternberger, 18 T.C. 836 (1952), aft'd, 207 F.2d 600 (2d Cit. 1953), reV'd on other
grounds, 384 U.S. 187 (1955) (although proceeds from sale of decedents residence were
not needed to pay debts or expenses of estate, controlling facts were that executor
had power of sale under will, that he, rather than trustee, actually sold property,
and that "the expenses of the sale were properly allowed as administration expenses
under New York law," id. at 842); Estate of Bluestein, 15 T.C. 770 (1950) (decided
prior to Estate of Bosch, see notes 81-93 infra & accompanying text) (deciding factor
was allowance of disputed court costs by the state court after a true adversary pro-
ceeding "in which the facts and issues were fully and properly presented," id. at
783-84); Estate of Martha Allison, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 932 (1946) (realtor's
commission allowed when rental property sold to avoid expending estate funds on
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ing that the expenditures were either allowed or allowable15 under state
law, while other decisions'6 have made the further inquiry as to whether
the expense was necessary to the administration of the estate. Tax Court
cases denying deductibility of administration expenses17 have relied uni-
formly upon the requirements of the regulations. 8 The circuit courts
also have reached conflicting results; a review of this confusion provides
an informative background for a more thorough examination of Smith.
It appears that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, considering
the deductibility of auctioneers' fees, assumed the validity of the regula-
tions. In Estate of Streeter v. Conmnissioner"9 the court denied the deduc-
tion of auctioneers' commissions because under decedent's will only the
trustees had the power to sell estate property. Therefore, the auctioneer's
repairs because executor's final account was approved by probate court and "decedent's
will specifically empowered the executor to sell the real estate," id. at 934); James
D. Bronson, 7 B.T.A. 127 (1927), aff'd, 32 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1929) (court stated that
"by section 403(a) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1921 [a predecessor of section 2053(a)]
Congress intended that the value of the gross estate should be reduced by the amount
of such usual and customary expenses incident to the administration and settlement of
estates as are permitted and authorized by the laws of the jurisdiction under which
such estate is administered and settled without specifically naming them," id. at 131)
(emphasis supplied).
15. The predecessor of section 2053 (a) read "the value of the net estate shall be
determined . . . by deducting . . . [sluch amounts . . . as are allowed by the laws of
the jurisdiction. ... INT. REV. CODE oF 1939, ch. 3, § 812(b), 53 Star. 123 (emphasis
supplied). See note 4 supra.
16. Estate of James S. Todd, 57 T.C. 288 (1971) (court held that state law controls
scope of administration expenses and, after examination of relevant Texas law found
that disputed expenses were allowable, but added, citing Treas. Reg. 20.2053-3(a), that
"[the burden is on the petitioners to prove that the interest expense was 'actually and
necessarily incurred'," id. at 296); Estate of Dudley S. Blossom, 45 B.T.A. 691, 693
(1941) (brokerage fees incurred in sale of securities to fund cash legacies were in
connection with administration of estate and therefore satisfied requirement of
Regulation 80 [now § 20.2053-3(d)]); Estate of Henry E. Huntington, 36 B.T.A.
698, 726 (1937) (although disputed expenses were incurred pursuant to order of
probate court, Board of Tax Appeals specifically found that expenses were "necessary"
part of administration of estate).
17. See, e.g., Estate of Edward N. Opal, 54 T.C. 154, 166 (1970), aff'd, 450 F.2d
1085 (2d Cir. 1971) (this issue not raised on appeal) (petitioner failed to carry her
burden of proof to show that accountant's fees were actually and necessarily in-
curred); Estate of Christine Swayne, 43 T.C. 190, 201 (1964) (order of probate court
authorizing sale of decedent's residence insufficient to establish necessity of sale);
Marion M. Jackson, 18 B.T.A. 875, 886 (1930) (portion of claimed deduction for
executor's commissions disallowed because executor in fact was functioning as
trustee); cf. Estate of Louvine M. Baldwin, 59 T.C. 654, 658-59 (1973) (probate court
did not authorize expense; expense in question not for benefit of estate and thertfore
not an expense of administration).
18. For relevant text of Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3, see note 5 supra.
19. 491 F.2d 375 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'g 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1175 (1971).
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fees were expenses of the trust, not of the estate, and did not qualify for
deduction under section 2053 (a).2 The court, however, citing section
20.2053-3 (d) (2) of the regulations, noted that "if the executors had
been empowered by the will to sell assets to effect distribution, auctioneer
fees, stipulated to be reasonable, would have been deductible." 21 More-
over, two district courts22 in the Third Circuit, noting the conclusive
presumption under Pennsylvania law that a general power of sale in a
will is for the payment of decedent's debts, 23 held that expenses con-
nected with the sale of estate property were deductible since "neces-
sarily" incurred during settlement of the decedent's estate.24
Most of the litigation concerning the applicability of the regulations
under section 2053 has not examined the deductibility of expenses in-
curred during the sale of estate property, but rather, has examined other
types of administration expenses, especially attorney's fees. In this area
as well, the regulations impose limitations upon the statutory standard of
allowability under state law; the expenses must have been actually and
necessarily incurred25 for the benefit of the estate. The regulations also
prohibit a deduction for attorney's fees incurred for the benefit of the
individual heirs or legatees.26
20. Id. at 378.
21. Id. (dicta). In an earlier case, Sharpe's Estate v. Conrmissioner, 148 F.2d 179
(3d Cir. 1945), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit distinguished the duties
of an executor from those of a trustee: "The work of the executor is part of the
settlement of a decedent's estate. It is done for the benefit of all who are interested,
his creditors, his next of kin, his legatees. But the carrying on of the trust is a different
enterprise, not in settlement of a dead man's affairs, but for the benefit of the bene-
ficiaries of the trust. It operates to continue the affairs of the living, not to close up
those of the departed." Id. at 181.
Sharpe's Estate approved Treas. Reg. 80 (1937 ed.), Art. 33, which provided, inter
alia: "'Amounts paid as trustees' commissions do not constitute expenses of administra-
tion and are not deductible, whether received by the executor acting in the capacity
of a trustee or by a separate trustee as such.'" Id. The current corresponding pro-
vision is Treasury Regulation section 20.2053-3(b)(3), which provides in relevant
part: "Except to the extent that a trustee is in fact performing services with respect
to property subject to claims which would normally be performed by an executor,
amounts paid as trustees' commissions do nor constitute expenses of administration
under the first category... ." Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3 (b) (3) (1958).
22. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. McGinnes, 208 F. Supp. 228 (M.D. Pa. 1962),
aff'd, 324 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1963) (this issue not raised on appeal); Brown v. Smith,
153 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
23. See In re Shaffer's Estate, 360 Pa. 390, 61 A.2d 872 (1948).
24. 208 F. Supp. at 237-38; 153 F. Supp. at 678.
25. Treas. Reg. § 2 0.2053-3 (a) (1958). See note 5 supra.
26. With respect to deductibility of attorney's fees, Treasury Regulations section
20.2053-3(c) (3) provides: "(3) Attorneys' fees incurred by beneficiaries incident to
19751
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As to the deductibility of attorney's fees, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held in Dulles v. Johnson 7 that such fees, when incurred
by legatees and directed by the New York Surrogate's Court to be paid
by the executors out of the estate in accordance with New York law,
were administration expenses within the meaning of section 2053(a).
Subsequently, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
in Sussman v. United States,28 held that attorney's fees paid pursuant to
to an order of the surrogate were deductible, but hypothesized in dicta
that perhaps not every expense allowed under local law would be de-
ductible under section 2053 (a).29 The court held the regulations to be
inapplicable, ° however, apparently because the expenses were both
familiar and reasonable under the circumstances."
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted a similar is-
sue in Commercial National Bank v. United States.3 2 There the court
held that fees paid to caveators' attorneys pursuant to a settlement agree-
ment but not included in the court decree never became costs within
the meaning of the relevant state statute and, therefore, were not dedue-
tible for purposes of the federal estate tax.S In dicta, however, the court
indicated that the sole standard for determining deductibility was state
law. In reply to the Government's contention that had the expenses
been allowed3 4 under state law they still would be nondeductible for
purposes of the estate tax because incurred for the benefit of individual
heirs, the court stated: "This position is doubtful since it would seem to
have been the purpose of Congress to follow the state law in the allow-
ance for administration expenses .. . ." " More recently, however, a
litigation as to their respective interests do not constitute a proper deduction, inasmuch
as expenses of this character are incurred on behalf of the beneficiaries personally and
are not administration expenses." Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3 (c) (3) (1958).
27. 273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959).
28. 236 F. Supp. 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
29. Id. at 510.
30. "The regulations do not approach the precise point closely enough to be helpful,
but they cannot be read as leading to any different result in spite of the too dogmatic
tone of 26 C.F.R. § 20.2053-3 (c) (3)." Id.
31. Id.
32. 196 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1952).
33. Id. at 185.
34. The case arose under section 812(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
which provided a deduction for such amounts as were "allowed" by state law. See
note 4 supra.
35. 196 F.2d at 185. The court did state, however, that the regulations were consistent
with "the general purpose of the statute to limit the allowable deductions for adminis-
trative expenses to those incurred for the benefit of the estate." Id. at 184. Nonetheless,
[Vol. 17:363
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district court3 6 in the Fourth Circuit deferred to the regulations by hold-
ing that the expense in question was deductible if: (1) the state probate
court, examining the facts upon which deductibility depended under
state law, allowed the deduction, '3 7 and (2) the expense did not violate
the regulations that required expenditures to be essential to the proper
settlement of the estate and not incurred for the individual benefit of
the heirs, legatees or devisees.ta
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has considered the issue
of deductibility of administration expenses only once, in Pitner v. United
States.' The court there held that attorneys' fees incurred by benefi-
ciaries in determining their share of the estate were deductible as admin-
the court cautioned the regulations were to be applied "in connection!' with section
2053 (a). ld.
36. Hipp v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,678 (D.S.C. 1971). The expense
at issue was interest on a loan made by executors to pay federal and state estate taxes
when liquidation of stock, the main asset of the estate, would depress the market
value of the stock.
37. The Hipp Court relied upon Treasury Regulation section 20.2053-1 (b) (2) which
provides in relevant part:
(2) Effect of court decree. The decision of a local court as to the amount
and allowability under local law of a claim or administration expense will
ordinarily be accepted if the court passes upon the facts upon which
deductibility depends. If the court does not pass upon those facts, its
decree will, of course, not be followed. . . . However, the decree will
not necessarily be accepted even though it purports to decide the facts
upon which deductibility depends. It must appear that the court actually
passed upon the merits of the claim. This-will be presumed in all cases of
an active and genuine contest. If the result reached appears to be un-
reasonable, this is some evidence that there was not such a contest, but
it may be rebutted by proof to the contrary. If the decree was rendered
by consent, it will be accepted, provided the consent was a bona fide
recognition of the validity of the claim (and not a mere cloak for a gift)
and was accepted by the court as satisfactory evidence upon the merits.
It will be presumed that the consent was of this character, and was so
accepted, if given by all parties having an interest adverse to the claimant.
The decree will not be accepted if it is at variance with the law of the
State. ... On the other hand, a deduction for the amount of a bona fide
indebtedness of the decedent, or of a reasonable expense of administration,
will not be denied because no court decree has been entered if the amount
would be allowable under local law.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b) (2) (1958).
38. 72-1 U.S. Tax Gas. at 84,679-80. The court found that the borrowing of funds
and the expenditure of interest were essential to the proper settlement of the estate
and were not incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, legatees or devisees. Id.
at 84,680.
39. 388 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'g and remanding, Jacobs v. United States, 248
F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Tex. 1965) (remand to determine reasonableness of attorneys' fees).
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istration expenses, even though decedent's will never was probated and
Texas law prohibited formal administration of the estate on the ground
of no necessity.40 The court relied upon Conmnissioner v. Bronson4" in
support of its finding that "[a] formal probate proceeding is not a pre-
requisite to a deduction for federal estate tax purposes under § 2053
(a)." 42 The correct test, stated the court, should be whether the deduc-
tion is "allowable" by the laws of the jurisdiction under which the estate
is being administered. 3 But Texas law provided no guidance in this in-
quiry, since the applicable code provisions4" and case law 45 would leave
distribution of the estate and payment of expenses to the discretion of the
beneficiaries.46 Relying upon authority from other jurisdictions, the
court held that the fees in question would be allowed by a Texas court
and, therefore, were deductible.47 The court, however, also stated that
in order to be deductible, an administration expense additionally must
satisfy the requirements of federal law, 48 as defined by the regulations.49
40. 388 F.2d at 655-56 n.7, quoting TEx. PROB. CODE ANi. § 178 (1956).
41. 32 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1929).
42. 388 F.2d at 654, 658.
43. Id. at 655, 658.
44. See TEx. PROB. CODE AN,.. § 37 (Supp. 1974-75), which is similar in relevant part
to the statute before the court in Pitner.
45. Hart v. Hart, 170 S.W. 1071 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Patterson v. Allen, 50 Tex.
23 (1878).
46. 388 F.2d at 656.
47. Id. at 657-59.
48. The court in Pitner viewed the regulations as definitional. id. at 654. The court
further stated:
In the determination of deductibility under section 2053(a) (2), it is
not enough that the deduction be allowable under state law. It is necessary
as well that the deduction be for an "administration expense" within the
meaning of that term as it is used in the statute, and that the amount
sought to be deducted be reasonable under the circumstances. These are
both questions of federal law and establish the outside limits for what may
be considered allowable deductions under section 2053 (a) (2).
Id. at 659. However, the court continued:
In most instances the interest of the federal government in protecting its
revenues will coalesce with the interest of the state in protecting its
citizens, and the state law may be relied upon as a guide to what deduc-
tions may reasonably be permitted for federal estate tax purposes. In some
cases, however, the state law on its face or in its application may not be
responsive to the interests traditionally protected by the state. In other
cases, such as the one before us, the state might justifiably feel that it had
no interests to protect, and consequently fail to create rules to govern the
situation one way or the other. When for any of these reasons state law
fails in adequately representing the interest of the federal government, a
framework still exists grounded in federal law defining the limits to which
[Vol. 17:363
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As noted earlier, the Court of Appeals for theSixth Circuit held in
Estate of Park v, Commissioner50 "that the deductibility of an expense
under section 2053 (a) (or its predecessor) is governed by state law
alone." 51 In so holding, the court relied upon two earlier Sixth Circuit
cases, Goodwin's Estate v. CoMnissione,42 and Union Commerce Bank
v. Commissioner.13 In Goodwin's Estate, the court held that the order
of an Ohio probate court directing that daughters' claims for loans to
their father be paid out of his estate was controlling for purposes of the es-
tate tax deduction 54 on the grounds that section 812 (b) (3) of the Code,5
the predecessor of section 2053 (a), "expressly" made its operation de-
pendent upon state law.56 Union Commerce Bank cited Goodwin's Estate
as authority for the view that the express language of section 2053 (a)
was controlling.57 Giving great deference to the decision of the probate
an expense may go and still be considered deductible for federal estate
tax purposes.
Id.
This language has been subject to varying interpretations. The dissent in Smitb
argued that Pitner dictated reliance upon the regulations only when state law provided
no guidance. 510 F.Zd at 483 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). The majority in Smith stated
that Pitner rejected the proposition that the sole standard for deductibility under
section 2053 (a) is allowability under state law. Id. at 482 n.4.
49. For text of Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3 (a), see note 5 supra. The court rejected the
Government's contention that this regulation required that expenses incurred for the
individual benefit of the heirs be disallowed. Although recognizing that plaintiffs acted
in their own self-interest in instituting litigation to establish their rights to estate
assets, the court held that since distribution of the property to the persons entitled to it
thus was facilitated, the expenses came within the statute as being necessary to the
settlement of the estate. 388 F.2d at 660.
50. 475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973). See notes 11-13 supra & accompanying text.
51. Id. at 676.
52. 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953).
53. 339 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1964).
54. Goodwi n relied upon Treasury Regulation 105, section 81.30, 7 Fed. Reg. 1449
(1942), the predecessor of Treasury Regulations section 20.2053-1(b) (2), see note 37
supra, and Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934). Freuler held that the decision
of a probate court, until reversed or overruled, established the law of the state. This
holding was modified by Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 455 (1967); see
notes 81-93 infra & accompanying text.
The Government asserted in Goodwin that the regulation was invalid, but the
court rejected this argument. "Treasury Regulations are ordinarily valid unless un-
reasonable or inconsistent with the statute. . . . If not unreasonable or plainly incon-
sistent with the revenue statutes, they should not be overruled except for weighty
reasons." 201 F.2d at 581.
55. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 812(b) (3). See note 4 supra.
56. 201 F.2d at 580.
57. 339 F.2d at 168. Since the Ohio probate court had not considered the question
1975]
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court, two other cases"' in the Sixth Circuit justified the allowance of
attorneys' fees as administration expenses. The inquiry of the reviewing
courts in these cases was restricted to whether the probate court was act-
ing within its jurisdiction under applicable state law."9
In Ballance v. United States,"0 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, citing Union Commerce Bank,' held that the regulations could
not delimit the broad scope of section 812 in determining whether post-
death interest on a claim against the estate was properly deductible as
an expense of administration.2 Subsequently, in Maebling v. United
States63 the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana cited
Ballance in relying solely upon Indiana law and the determination of the
probate court and held that the expenditure in question was reasonably
necessary for the benefit of the estate and was therefore allowable as a
deduction."
FSTATE OF DAVID SMITH V. COMMISSIONER
In the context of the conflicting authority cited above, Estate of
Smith65 presented to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit the
issue of the validity of the apposite regulations. David Smith, a sculptor,
died testate, leaving an estate, the major asset of which consisted of 425
pieces of abstract, metal sculpture. Smith's will gave three executor-
trustees the power to sell estate assets.6  To obtain higher prices for de-
of deductibility of interest or overdue gift taxes, this issue was remanded to the Tax
Court for additional testimony. Id.
58. Cadden v. Welch, 298 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1962); Schmalstig v. Connor, 46 F.
Supp. 531 (S.D. Ohio 1942).
59. 298 F.2d at 344; 46 F. Supp. at 533.
60. 347 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1965).
61. Id. at 423.
62. "[Tlhe definition of 'administration expenses' in the treasury regulations as such
expenses as are 'necessarily' incurred in the administration of the estate cannot
serve to override the statutory provision . . . authorizing the deduction of '[sluch
amounts . .. for administration expenses . . . as are allowed by the laws of the juris-
diction . . . under which the estate is being administered'." Id. Since Illinois law
allowed a credit for expenses of administration if it appeared that the expenditures
were reasonably necessary for the benefit of the estate, and since payment of claims
was postponed in this case in order to avoid the sale of estate assets at a sacrifice,
the resulting post-death interest was, under Illinois law, an allowable expense of
administration. Id.
63. 20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5997, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,617 (S.D. Ind 1967).
64. 20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 5999, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,618.
65. 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975).
66. Estate of David Smith, 57 T.C. 650, 654 (1972).
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cedent's art, the executors, rather than immediately offering the pieces
to the public en masse, 7 began an orderly process of gradual liquidation
through Marlborough-Gerson Galleries, which was entitled to a one-
third commission on the net proceeds of any sale."' The gallery was paid
commissions totalling $1,583,544.67, which were allowed by the New
York Surrogate's Court; the executors contended that this amount was
deductible on the federal estate tax return as an administration expense
under section 2053 (a). The Tax Court allowed a deduction of only
$750,447.74,69 the exact amount necessary to pay for administration ex-
penses, debts, and taxes as finally adjudicated. 0
Relying upon section 20.2053-3 (d) (2) of the regulationse1 and an
earlier tax decision72 sustaining the restrictive language of the regulations,
67. Although Smith had begun to gain critical recognition of his work toward
the end of his life he had never been a commercially successful artist. A public
auction would have revealed the large number of works in Smith's possession at his
death and caused a significant decline in their value. Id. at 652, 653.
68. 57 T.C. at 653; 510 F.2d at 480.
69. Five judges dissented on the issue of administration expenses; the dissenting
opinion raised the invalidity of the regulations for the first time: "It is apparent that
the regulations impose a limitation upon the deductibility of selling expenses not
prescribed by the Code, to wit, the sale giving rise to the expense must be necessary
in order to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of administration, or taxes, to preserve
the estate or to effect distribution." 57 T.C. at 663-64 (Goffe, J, dissenting). "I submit
that Congress considered only the limitation of State law in enacting section 2053
(a) (2). . . "' Id. at 664. This issue was not presented to the Tax Court, for the
executors argued that the commissions had been incurred necessarily to preserve the
estate or to effect distribution of the estate. Id. at 660.
70. The case was before the Tax Court on a petition by the executors for a redeter-
muination of the notice of deficiency by the Commissioner on Aug. 7, 1969. (This was
three years after the estate tax return had been filed, on Aug. 24, 1966, and over one
year after a deficiency of $46,449.67 had been agreed upon and paid, on July 10,
1968.) The 1969 deficiency of $2,444,629.17 was based upon a valuation of Smith's
estate at $5,256,918 and a disallowance of any sales commissions in excess of $289,661.65.
The Tax Court reduced the value of the estate to $2,700,000.00; no appeal was taken
from this appraisal. For a discussion of the valuation issue in this case, see Echter,
Equitable Treatment for the Artist's Estate, 114 TRusrs & ESTATES 394 (1975).
71. For text of Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3 (d) (2), see note 5 supra.
72. 57- T.C. at 660, citing Estate of Christine Swayne, 43 T.C. 190 (1964). The
majority in Smith read Swayne as holding that expenses must be necessary to the
administration of decedents estate, as required by the regulations, in order to be
deductible for purposes of the federal estate tax. Id. The Smith dissent, however,
argued that the validity of the regulations was neither challenged nor considered in
Swayne. Id. at 663, 665 (Goffe, J., dissenting).
The Smith executors distinguished Swayne from their case, Brief for Appellants
at 21, 22, Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1975), by pointing
out that in Swayne, decedents executor was also her son and beneficiary. As executor
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the Tax Court held that allowance of the commissions by the New York
Surrogate's Court was not sufficient to establish their deductibility under
section 2053 (a). As noted earlier, satisfaction of the regulations, as well
as of the statutory standard, was deemed a condition precedent to a
finding of deductibility.73 The court found that only a portion of the
sculpture was sold to satisfy expenses and claims against the estate; the
remainder of the works were sold to fund the trusts. Consequently, the
commissions paid on these later sales were deemed not deductible as
proper administration expenses.74
Estate of Park7 5 specifically rejected the reasoning of the Tax Court
he instituted a special proceeding in the probate court seeking the court's approval of
the sale of decedent's home, which had been devised to him. The application was
not opposed, and the probate court allowed the sale upon the ground that the specific
devisee has consented. Expenses of the sale later were allowed by the probate court
as administration expenses. The same expenses, however, then were disallowed by the
state tax commissioner as administration expenses in his computation of the state
succession tax, and this action was approved by the probate court. Estate of Christine
Swavne, 43 T.C. 190, 201 (1964). Since the Tax Court was presented with three con-
flicting state court decrees, it was justified, stated the Smith executors, in looking
behind the state court proceedings pursuant to the terms of Treasury Regulations
section 20.2053-1(b) (2) (for text see note 37 sutpra) and in finding that the taxpayer
had not demonstrated the necessity of the sale under either federal or state law.
The Swayne court apparently held that applicable Connecticut law and necessity
for the sale had not been documented by taxpayers, who had the burden of showing
that state law supported their contentions. Bonney v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 237,
239 (2d Cir. 1957). In Swayne the deductibility of expenses incurred in the sale of
decedent's home was a subsidiary problem, involving only $2,847.44. The primary
issue in the case was deductibility of counsel fees totalling 925,000.00. It is reasonable
that petitioners' brief would have concentrated on this point, and in fact the Tax
Court did reverse the Commissioner and held that the attorneys' fees were deductible.
Understandably, there was no appeal in this case. It is arguable, however, that had
a well-documented brief demonstrated specific reasons for the sale in question and
examined Connecticut law on this issue (no statutory rule as to allowance of adminis-
tration expenses, but see Ballard v. Ballard, 13 Conn. Supp. 400 (1945), requiring
"necessity"), a reversal might have resulted.
73. 57 T.C. at 660-61. The Tax Court excused Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v.
McGinnes, 208 F. Supp. 288 (M.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 324 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1963) and
Brown v. Smith, 153 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. Pa. 1957) because of the presumption of
"necessity" under Pennsylvania law. id. at 661; see notes 22-23 supra & accompanying
text. This would appear, however, to support the argument of the executors in
Smith that the only relevant standard under section 2053 (a) is state law. If this were only
a threshold requirement, as held by the Tax Court, then the Dauphin and Brown
courts would have been free to consider whether the expenses at issue were also
"necessary" under the treasury regulation.
74. 57 T.C. at 661-62.
75. 475 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1973). Mabel F. Colton Park's estate contained two
residences that were to pass to her four sons under the residuary clause of her will.
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in Smith, r6 and held that the exclusive criteria for deductibility under
section 2053 (a) should be the standard provided for in the statute itself,
allowability as defined by the laws of the jurisdiction under which the
estate is being administered. 77 The court reasoned that if the executor,
in the exercise of sound judgment approved by the probate court, be-
lieved that the estate would benefit by the sale of the property in ques-
tion, a deduction under section 2053 (a) should not'be denied because the
Government deemed the sale to have been unnecessary.78
Subsequent to Park, the executors of the Smith estate appealed the
decision of the Tax Court. In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ignored Park,79 finding unnecessary any consideration
of the validity of the regulations.8 0 By relying on Conmnissioner v. Estate
of Bosch, s1 the court avoided discussing a possible conflict between the
statute and the regulations.8" In Bosch the Supreme Court held that
The sons decided they did not want the properties and requested the administrator
to sell them under the power given him in the will. The brokerage fees and other
expenses incurred in the sales were disallowed as administration expenses by the
Commissioner, and the disallowance was upheld by the Tax Court, 57 T.C. 705, 710
(1972), on the basis that the sale of the real estate was for the sole benefit of the
beneficiaries and the expenses incurred in the sale were not necessary to pay dece-
dent's debts, expenses of administration, or taxes and not necessary to preserve the
estate or effect distribution, as required by the regulations.
76. 475 F.2d at 676.
77. "By the literal language of § 2053 (a), Congress has left the deductibility of
administration expenses to be governed by their chargeability against the assets of
the estate under state law." Id. (emphasis supplied).
78. Id. at 676-77.
79. The dissent felt that Park was precisely on point and that the five dissenting
Tax Court judges were correct in finding that the determination of the New York
Surrogate as to deductibility was binding. Id. at 483, 485 (Mulligan, J., dissenting).
80. For text of Treas. Reg. section 20.2053-3 (d) (2) see note 5 supra. The majority also
failed to mention Estate of Christine Swayne, 43 T.C. 190 (1964), the case that the
Tax Court had found to be controlling. For discussion of Swayne, see note 72 supra.
81. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
82. The court noted that the New York Surrogate's Court Act, see note 86 infra,
like most state laws concerning executors and administrators, required an administra-
tion expense to be "necessary" in order to be allowable and acknowledged that a
surrogate's decree approving an expenditure as a proper administration expense under
New York law normally would be controlling and would not "raise questions
concerning possible discrepancies between § 2053 of the . . . Code . . . and Treas.
Reg. § 20.2053-3(d)(2)". 510 F. 2d at 482 (emphasis supplied). Since the interest
of the federal government in taxing the transfer of wealth at death, however, will
not always completely or accurately be reflected in a state's interests in supervising
the fiduciary responsibilities of executors", id., "the federal courts cannot be precluded
from re-examining a lower state court's allowance of administration expenses to
determine whether they were in fact necessary to carry out the administration of the
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"where federal estate tax liability turns upon the character of a property
interest held and transferred by the decedent under state law, federal
authorities are not bound by the determination made of such property
interest by a state trial court," s3 but "must apply what they find to be
the state law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other
courts of the State." 84 The appellate court in Smith thus reasoned that
the Tax Court's finding that the additional sales of sculpture were not
"necessary," did not involve a refusal to follow New York law.8 '5 Rather,
because section 222 of the New York Surrogate's Court Act" required
that allowable administration expenses be "necessary," the Tax Court
merely was exercising its duty under Bosch to make a de novo determi-
nation of the factual necessity for these expenditures.8 7
The holding of the Smith court was surprising, as considerable prior
case law supported the position of the estate. 8 Moreover, the cases cited
in Smith to justify affirmance of the Tax Court's holding are not per-
suasive. Reliance on Estate of Bosch, for instance, appears erroneous
for three reasons. First, as noted by the dissent in Smith, the Court in
Bosch, examining application of the marital deduction, relied upon a
report of the Senate Finance Committee," which recommended "that
estate or merely prudent or advisable in preserving the interests of the beneficiaries."
Id. at 482-83.
83. Id. at 457.
84. Id. at 465.
85. 510 F.2d at 483.
86. Section 222 of the New York Surrogate's Court Act, in effect at the time of
Smith's death, provided:§ 222. Payment of expenses incurred by representative.
An executor, administrator, guardian or testamentary trustee may pay
from the funds or estate in his hands, from time to time, as shall be
necessary, his legal and proper expenses of administration necessarily
incurred by him, including the reasonable expense of obtaining and
continuing his bond and the reasonable counsel fees necessarily incurred
in the administration of the estate. Such expenses and disbursements shall
be set forth in his account when filed, and settled by the surrogate.
N.Y. Su. CT. Acr § 222 (McKinney 1920).
87. 510 F.2d at 483.
88. See, e.g., Estate of Park, 475 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1973); Ballance v. United States,
347 F.2d 419, 423 (7th Cir. 1965); Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 369-79 (2d Cir. 1959);
Estate of Louis Sternberger, 18 T.C. 836, 843, aff'd, 207 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953);
Estate of Martha Allison, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 932,934 (1946). Further, the
only case precisely in agreement with the position of the Government and the Tax
Court on the additional requirement of "necessity" under the regulation was Estate
of Christine Swayne, 43 T.C. 190 (1964), see note 72 supra, a case that was not cited
by the appellate court in Smith.
89. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948). See Estate of Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 510 F.2d 479, 481 n.1 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mulligan, J., dissenting).
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'proper regard,' not finality, should be given to the interpretation of a
will by a state court." 0 When administration expenses are deducted,
however, the statute itself specifically makes its operation dependent
upon state law." Second, the Tax Court in Smith clearly did not make
its own interpretation of New York law; rather, it held that there were
additional criteria under federal law that the estate had not satisfied 92
Third, Bosch stated that a federal court must make its own determination
of relevant state law and was not bound by the interpretation of a lower
state court, whereas Smith involved no question concerning the applica-
ble New York law. What the Snith court implied, however, was that a
federal court could reconsider the state court decision and make new
findings of fact 9 3
Despite its assertion that consideration of the validity of the regula-
tion was unnecessary, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ap-
90. 510 F.2d at 481 n.1 (Mulligan, J., dissenting), citing 387 U.S. at 464. The
Supreme Court reasoned: "We cannot say that the authors of this directive intended
that the decrees of state trial courts were to be conclusive and binding on the com-
putation of the federal estate tax as levied by the Congress. If the Congress had
intended state trial court determinations to have that effect on the federal actions,
it certainly 'would have said so-which it did not do." Id. (emphasis supplied). But see
H.R. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954) on the reenactment of section 2053, note 117
infra, whikh mentioned only allowability under state law as a limitation on the
deduction. See also Ir. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 812(b) (amended in 1950 to repeal this
feature), which allowed the gross estate to be reduced by amounts "reasonably
required and actually expended" for the support of the decedent's dependents during
the settlement of the estate to the extent that such expenses were allowed by state
law. This repealed statute lends support to the argument that if Congress had intended
an additional requirement of necessity it would have stated so in the statute.
91. 510 F.2d at 484 n.1 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). It should be noted, however, that
the Bosch rule has been applied with respect to section 2053 (a) deductions in the
following cases: Kasishke v. United States, 426 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1970) (claim
against the estate held properly disallowed by district court under Oklahoma law
even though approved by probate court); Underwood v. United States, 407 F.2d
608 (6th "Cir. 1969), rev'g and rentanding on this issue but aff'g on another issue,
270 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (court supported probate's allowance of an 8%
executor commission even though will limited commissions to 5%, because state law
did not forbid a court from allowing compensation in excess of amount fixed in
will); Hipp v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,678 (D.S.C. 1971) (interest paid
on loan obtained to pay federal and state taxes held to be properly authorized by
probate court under local law); Estate of Anna Lewis, 49 T.C. 684 (1968) (dis-
allowance of claim barred by Michigan statute of limitations as interpreted by state's
highest court even though allowed by probate court).
92. 57 T.C. at 661.
93. "[T]he Tax Court's determination .. .did not involve a refusal to follow New
York law, but rather was the result of a de novo inquiry into the factual necessity
for these expenditures." 510 F.2d at 483 (emphasis supplied).
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peared to support the Tax Court's view that the regulations establish
additional criteria under federal law and cited Pitner v. United States?4
as establishing the Fifth Circuit's agreement with this position. 5 But the
situation confronting the Pitner court was totally unlike that presented
in Estate of Smith. Pitner examined the deductibility of an administration
expense for which Texas law did not provide." The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit indicated that state law ordinarily could be relied
upon as a guide to what deductions may be permitted for federal estate
tax purposes, but the Pitner court recognized that in some instances
state law might fail to represent adequately the interests of the federal
government. In such situations, noted the court, the expenditure should
be measured against the federal definition of administration expenses as
found in the regulations. This position seems inapplicable to Smith,
as New York law, both statutory 8 and decisional,99 specifically allowed
the type of expense in issue.
The Smith court also relied upon Conmmercial National Bank,100 a case
that would appear to support the position of the estate more than that
of the Government. In Comnercial National Bank the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit clearly indicated that its decision was controlled by
North Carolina law.101 As noted earlier, the expenses reviewed by the
court in Comnercial National Bank were not deductible for purposes
of the federal estate tax because they were not allowed by the laws of
the jurisdiction under which the estate was being administered. °2 The
court rejected the Government's contention that even if the fees had
been assessed as costs by the state court they would not be deductible
for purposes of the estate tax' 03 because they were not administrative
expenses within the meaning of the federal statute but were incurred for
the individual benefit of the heirs and widow.' °' The court indicated that
94. 388 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1967). See notes 39-49 supra & accompanying text. At
issue in Pitner was the deductibility of attorneys' fees and other expenses of litigation
incurred by the beneficiaries in two separate suits.
95. 510 F.2d at 482-83 n.4.
96. See note 40 supra & accompanying text.
97. 388 F.2d at 659; see note 48 spra & accompanying text.
98. N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT § 222 (McKinney 1920); for text see note 86 supra.
99. In re Rosenberg's Estate, 6 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
100. 196 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1952). See notes 32-35 supra & accompanying text.
101. Id. at 184-85.
102. See notes 32-35 supra.
103. Id. at 185 (dictum).
104. Id. at 183-84.
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Congress had intended state law to be controlling in determining the
deductibility of an administration expense.'0 5
In further support of its holding, the court in Smith, relying on
United States v. Stapf,00 stated that administration expenses must be of
"the 'type intended to be deductible' . . . , ultimately a question of fed-
eral law." 107 In Stapf the Supreme Court considered whether a deduc-
tion could be taken for the entire amount of the community's debts and
expenses, when the decedent's will directed that his executors pay all
community expenses and debts entirely out of his half of the community
property. 08 The Court concluded that these "claims against the estate"
and "administration expenses" were not of the type intended to be de-
ductible under the provisions of section 812 (b) because the effect would
be to authorize tax free gifts, contrary to the general policy of the fed-
eral estate tax.' Stapf is distinguishable from Smith for the simple rea-
son that the payments therein examined were characterized by the
Supreme Court as marital gifts rather than as claims or expenses. 10
In yet another instance of inappropriate reliance, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that the decision of the Tax Court would be
affirmed because it was not "clearly erroneous," as required by Commis-
sioner v. Duberstein."' Reliance on Duberstein is inapposite since it
merely recognizes that the clearly erroneous test is applied when an ap-
pellate court is reviewing questions of fact;" 2 the court in Smith ex-
amined a question of law. The statute in Smith provided a standard for
determining what was an allowable administration expense under state
law. The issue was whether the Code should be interpreted according
105. Id. at 185 (dictum).
106. 375 U.S. 118 (1964).
107. 510 F.2d at 482 n.4, quoting United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 130 (1964).
108. Absent this provision in the will, Texas law would provide that "only one-
half of the community debts would be charged to the decedent's half of the com-
munity." 375 U.S. at 130.
109. Id. at 131.
110. Id. at 134.
111. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). In Duberstein the Court considered what standard to apply
in determining what constituted a gift within the meaning of section 102(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provided no statutory guidelines for this
determination. The Supreme Court held that this question must be decided on a case
by case basis by the trial court, which could weigh the totality of the facts in each
situation. 363 U.S. at 290. Consequently, appellate review of Tax Court determinations
in this area would be quite restricted. See Griswold, Of Time and Attitudes-Pro-
fessor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARv. L. REv. 81, 86-91 (1960) (Duberstein criti-
cized as typical of "'excessive deference to triers of fact").
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
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to its literal language or as clarified by the regulations. Since statutory
interpretation always is reviewable, the appellate court was free to sub-
stitute its own judgment on this question for that of the Tax Court.113
The test proposed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Smith would require a federal court, in every case involving applica-
tion of section 2053(a), to review the decision of the state probate
court and determine if an allowed expense was in fact necessary to carry
out the administration of the estate and was, therefore, the type of expense
intended to be deductible under the statute. In some cases this test might
lead to an absolute rejection of the statutory standard of allowability
under state law. This situation was avoided in Smith because the applica-
ble New York law also required the expenditures to be "necessary"; in
some states, however, this determination is left to the discretion of the
probate court."4 Although Treasury Regulations ordinarily are accorded
great weight, they must be interpreted, if possible, consistently with the
statutory mandate; a regulation in derogation of the Code is invalid." 5
The Smith court approved, at least implicitly,"16 the standard set forth
in the regulations. The legislative history of section 2053 (a) does not
indicate, however, that Congress approved the definition of administra-
tive expenses set forth in the regulations as the type of expense intended
to be deductible under section 2053 (a). The House Reports recommend-
ing adoption of this section of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 noted
the state law limitation, but did not mention the corresponding regula-
tion."' The Tax Court in Smnith relied upon the principle of statutory
113. See 510 F.2d at 485 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). As a result of legislation in 1948
Congress negated the favored position enjoyed by Tax Court decisions under the
Supreme Court's ruling in Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). Commis-
sioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 291 n.13. Section 7482(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 now provides in pertinent part: "The United States Courts of Appeals
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tax Court . . . in the
same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions
tried without a jury.. . ." INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 7482(a).
114. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21 (1969); 52 N.C.L. REv. 190, 199-200 & nn.48-51
(1973).
115. The Supreme Court has stated that "[clourts need not defer to an administra-
tive construction of a statute where there are 'compelling indications that it is
wrong.'" Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973), citing Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). See United States v. Calamaro,
354 U.S. 351, 359 (1957); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d at 484 (Mulli-
gan, J., dissenting); Dorfman v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 651, 655 (2d Cir. 1968).
116. See note 82 supra.
117. This argument was raised by the dissent in Estate of David Smith v. Com-
missioner, 57 T.C. 650, 664 (1972) (Mulligan, J., dissenting).
The House Report provides:
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reenactment to support the validity of the regulation. This principle of
statutory construction has been criticized by the Supreme Court, parti-
cularly when the legislative history has not considered or indicated Con-
gressional approval of prior administrative or judicial construction. 1 "
Smith also creates practical problems for executors in the fulfillment
of their duties and for courts that must review their actions. The test
proposed in Smith continues the confusing distinction, inherent in the
regulations, between expenses incurred for the benefit of the estate and
those incurred for the benefit of individual beneficiaries. Courts have dif-
fered on this determination in the past;" 9 under Smith both taxpayers
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will continue to have grounds
for appeal on this issue.
G. Expenses, indebtedness, and taxes (sec. 2053)
Funeral expenses, administration expenses, claims against the estate and
unpaid mortgages are deductible in computing the taxable estate under
present law. However, this deduction is lhnited to those expenses allowable
by the laws of the jurisdiction under which the estate is being administered
and cannot exceed the value of the property included in the gross estate
subject to claims, that is, the probate estate. Thus, if the decedent has
placed most of his assets in a trust (not includible in his probate estate)
funeral and other expenses actually paid . . . out of the trust assets are
not allowed as a deduction to the extent they exceed the value of the
property in the probate estate.
These arbitrary distinctions have been removed under your committee's
bill. Expenses incurred in connection with property subjected to the
estate tax, although not in the probate estate, are to be allowed as deduc-
tions, if the expenses are of the type which would be allowed as deductions
if the property were in the probate estate and they are actually paid
within 1 year of the decedent's death.
In addition, expenses in connection with property subject to claims are
to be allowed without regard to the total value of the probate estate if
they are paid within the period provided for the assessment of the estate
tax.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954) (emphasis supplied).
118. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (questions
significance of re-enactment without express approval'of prior interpretation); Estate
of David Smith, 57 T.C. 650, 664 (1972) (Goffe, J., dissenting). But see Morgan v.
Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940), in which the Court stated: "With these regula-
tions outstanding Congress has several times re-enacted § 302(f), and has thus adopted
the administrative construction."
119. Compare Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651, 660 (5th Cir. 1967); Dulles v.
Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1959); Commercial Nat'1 Bank v. United States,
196 F.2d 182, 185 (4th Cit. 1952); Schmalstig v. Connor, 46 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D.
Ohio 1942); Estate of Harry Porter, 49 T.C. 207, 225 (1967), with Jacobs v. United
States, 248 F. Supp. 695, 699-700 (ED. Tex. 1965) (reversed by Pitner); Estate of
Louvine M. Baldwin. 59 T.C. 654, 659 (1973); Estate of Edward N. Opal, 54 T.C. 154,
166 (1970); Estate of Christine Swayne, 43 T.C. 190, 201 (1964).
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The decision also places an unrealistic burden on executors of large
estates with few liquid assets, who now must anticipate exactly how much
will be required for payment of debts, expenses, and taxes, and then liqui-
date only so much of the estate's property as will produce this amount of
ready cash. This determination is difficult when as in this case, valuation
of the gross estate also is contested,12° and may actually conflict with a
fiduciary's duty to protect the assets of the estate.' 1
Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not decide
specifically the validity of section 20.2053-3 (d) (2) of the Treasury
Regulations, it affirmed the decision of the Tax Court upholding the
regulation. The Smith court also reiterated the Tax Court's position that
an expense incurred for the benefit of individual beneficiaries was not
deductible, a requirement that had been rejected by several prior cases. 2
Smith acknowledged a potential conflict between section 2053 (a) and
the regulation but refused to consider this issue and failed to provide
any viable test for the future. The decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in Park provides a more practical solution, one that
recognizes the realities of estate administration. Park's rejection of the
regulation is also more consonant with the statutory mandate. Section
2053 (a), by its express terms, makes its operation dependent upon state
law; any additional limitations should come from Congress.Y
120. Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 19, 29 (D. Kan. 1964)
(As a practical matter the original federal estate tax return in larger estates is pre-
liminary and exploratory, since the taxpayer cannot know if the Government will
approve valuation of assets, marital deduction, or deductions under section 2053).
121. See 52 N.C. L. REv., supra note 114, at 196-97.
122. See, e.g., Hipp v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,680 ("[lt is almost
axiomatic . . . that what benefits an estate . . . will also benefit the takers thereof.");
Estate of Harry Porter, 49 T.C. at 255 (fact that some benefit results to beneficiaries
is not a reason to disallow expense).
123. "If additional safeguards are needed they should come from Congress, not
from the Secretary or his delegate in the form of unauthorized regulations. In my
opinion the integrity of the estate tax must be safeguarded from unauthorized and
unwarranted limitations imposed by regulations as well as abuses which may occur
elsewhere." 57 T.C. at 665 (Goffe, J., dissenting).
